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ABSTRACT 
The United States and the Chinese are engaged in an artificial intelligence (AI) 
competition. The Chinese AI initiatives in Latin America have given it an initial 
advantage in the region against the United States. First, the thesis examines the Chinese 
broader technology initiatives and shows how the Chinese plan to use AI to gain 
advantages economically, politically, and militarily to become the world leader in AI. 
Next, the thesis examines data that shows how the Chinese have many countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean that are using AI technology from Chinese companies, and 
that the United States has significantly fewer countries choosing its technology. Finally, 
the thesis explains that the United States has some advantages in AI development, but 
there is the potential for the United States to lose out to the Chinese in the Latin 
American and Caribbean market, which would negatively affect the United States’ 
long-term national security. Therefore, the thesis argues that America should use security 
sector assistance to help improve Latin American and Caribbean indigenous capabilities 
and improve the relationships with United States private business, academia, and security 
institutions. The United States should implement changes so that it remains the AI partner 
of choice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
AI holds the potential to be a major driver of economic growth and social 
progress.1 
Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia but for all 
humankind. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are 
difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will 
become the ruler of the world.2 
Artificial intelligence will likely change the character of warfare, and I 
believe whoever masters it first will dominate on the battlefield for many, 
many, many years. It’s a fundamental game-changer. We have to get there 
first.3 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION
This thesis answers the question, what are the United States national security
concerns related to Chinese artificial intelligence and machine learning initiatives in Latin 
America?   
1. Main Findings and Argument
The United States and the People’s Republic of China are engaged in a competition 
including technology competition. The thesis examines how artificial intelligence and 
machine learning initiatives by the Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean fit into the 
competition and how the artificial intelligence initiatives affect the United States national 
security concerns. Chapter two examines the Chinese broader technology initiatives and 
shows how the Chinese plan to use artificial intelligence to gain advantages economically, 
politically, and militarily to become the leader in artificial intelligence for the world. 
1 James Vincent, “China and the U.S. Are Battling to Become the World’s First AI Superpower,” The 
Verge, August 3, 2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/3/16007736/china-us-ai-artificial-intelligence. 
2 Vladimir Putin, “‘Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World’: Putin to Russian Children on 
Knowledge Day,” RT International, accessed July 31, 2020, https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-
world-putin/. 
3 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), “DOD’s AI 2020 Symposium and Exposition,” accessed 
August 5, 2020, https://www.ai.mil/ai2020.html. 
2 
Chapter three shows how the Chinese have many countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean that are using artificial intelligence technology from Chinese companies, and 
the United States has significantly less countries choosing their technology. The data used 
came from multiple sources that correlation data regarding Chinese artificial intelligence 
companies. Chapter four explains that the United States has some advantages in artificial 
intelligence development, but there is the potential for the United States to lose out to the 
Chinese in the Latin American and Caribbean market, which would negatively affect the 
United States long term national security.  Therefore, the thesis argues that the United 
States should use security sector assistance to help improve Latin America and Caribbean 
countries indigenous capabilities and improve the relationships with United States private 
business, academia, and the security institutions. The United States should implement 
changes, so the United States remains the artificial intelligence partner of choice.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) will change the world.4  At 
the same time, the United States is competing in great power rivalry or great power 
competition.5  China is challenging “American power, influence, and interests, attempting 
to erode American security and prosperity.”6  Among various tools, China is using artificial 
intelligence as means to engage in the competition because artificial intelligence has a 
geopolitical impact.7 As part of the Western Hemisphere, Latin American countries are a 
key terrain in which the competition is taking place.8  Since Latin American countries do 
 
4 Vincent, “China and the U.S. Are Battling to Become the World’s First AI Superpower”; Putin, 
“‘Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World’”; Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), “DOD’s AI 
2020 Symposium and Exposition,” accessed August 5, 2020, https://www.ai.mil/ai2020.html. 
5 Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s 
Competitive Edge (Department of Defense, 2018), 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/
2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf; Ronald O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: 
Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, Version 59, R43838 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2020), 1–2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/59. 
6 O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, 22. 
7 The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, American Artificial Intelligence 
Initiative: Year One Annual Report (United States of America: The White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, 2020), i, iv. 
8 O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, 1–2. 
3 
not have robust technology, the Chinese can sell the technology to these countries. The 
technology and competition have and will have national security concerns if the United 
States cedes influence on China over the norms, ethics, and trading patterns regarding 
artificial intelligence in Latin America.9   
In the event the United States does not become the partner of choice for artificial 
intelligence in Latin America, we will lose political, economic, or military influence there 
and, and from a practical standpoint, that will have severe consequences. If the United 
States stops being the partner of choice, then it can assume that national and economic 
security will be affected because regionally, there will be less United States infrastructure, 
standards, and investment, which has long-term national security consequences. Second, if 
Chinese technology companies can sell their products to some Latin American countries, 
then it is more likely that other countries in the region will bandwagon or what might be 
called economic bandwagoning or a bandwagon effect.10 Third, the Chinese introduction 
of artificial intelligence technology could enhance and complicate cyber-related concerns, 
including economic espionage, data collection, and surveillance concerns. Specifically, the 
increased number of Chinese artificial intelligence companies and software may give the 
Chinese increased vectors to collect information, conduct cyber espionage, conduct cyber-
enabled information operations, or conduct offensive cyber operations.  
Conversely, suppose the United States maintains and increases our Latin America 
role. In that case, it is safe to assume that positive economic benefits for American 
corporations reduce the cyber and intelligence security risks and influence the norms and 
ethics in the artificial intelligence worlds. From a realist perspective, it can be assumed that 
the United States does not want China influencing Latin American countries since, 
historically, the region has been considered America’s backyard. If Chinese companies 
 
9 Meg King et al., “Modern Conflict and Artificial Intelligence,” Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, accessed April 15, 2021, https://www.cigionline.org/modern-conflict-and-artificial-intelligence. 
10 Jeffrey H. Rohlfs, Bandwagon Effects in High Technology Industries | MIT Press EBooks | IEEE 
Xplore (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press, 2001), 1, 55, https://ieeexplore-
ieee-org.libproxy.nps.edu/book/6276839; Michael A. Cusumano, Yiorgos Mylonadis, and Richard S. 
Rosenbloom, “Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over Beta,” The 
Business History Review 66, no. 1 (1992): 51, 86, https://doi.org/10.2307/3117053. 
4 
were to influence Latin American countries, then American values like free speech might 
not be the priority or the focus when setting the rules for the algorithms that run smart 
platforms.11 
For the United States to remain a partner of choice and succeed in great power 
rivalry, it must be able to quantify and evaluate its current status. The assumption for the 
thesis is that the United States wants to understand where it stands in comparison to China 
in the technology competition with artificial intelligence in Latin America. The United 
States will likely have to continue with the status quo or choose a different statecraft tool 
to adjust the policies or strategy for Latin America and artificial intelligence to ensure the 
United States’ national security.  
The research focuses on Chinese artificial intelligence initiatives inside of Latin 
America and the impacts on the United States’ national security. The first area of research 
will be the Chinese domestic surveillance software sold to various countries and regimes 
in Latin America. Second, the research will focus on the impacts of Chinese artificial 
intelligence-enabled cyber operations in Latin America. Third, the thesis will answer if the 
United States has lost market share or influence in the region due to the competition with 
China regarding artificial intelligence and has that loss impacted our national security 
interests. Finally, the thesis will answer the question, what can the United States 
government, military, or commercial sector do about the artificial intelligence competition?  
The standards, values, and ethics built into technology in general can be 
complicated, especially with a continually evolving technology like artificial intelligence. 
It can be assumed that the creation of artificial intelligence standards will be an area of 
competition in the “political and cognitive realms.”12  The “winner-take-all” battle will 
likely be a long process, and there are likely different variables and strategies that the 
 
11 Sam Shead, “TikTok Apologizes after Being Accused of Censoring #BlackLivesMatter Posts,” 
CNBC, June 2, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/02/tiktok-blacklivesmatter-censorship.html. 
12 Raghu Garud, Sanjay Jain, and Arun Kumaraswamy, “Institutional Entrepreneurship in the 
Sponsorship of Common Technological Standards: The Case of Sun Microsystems and Java,” The 
Academy of Management Journal 45, no. 1 (2002): 210, https://doi.org/10.2307/3069292. 
5 
United States with a whole-of-government or whole-of-country approach can take to 
compete in the arena.13 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review consists of five sections: First, defining artificial intelligence 
since various technologies are associated with it, including automation, robotics, and 
machine learning. Second, the section reviews key statements and ideas from international 
leaders. Third, the review will describe scholarship, which discusses the U.S. competition 
with China for influence within the great power competition in Latin America. Fourth, it 
will describe research on artificial intelligence as a tool that can be used to influence and 
has geopolitical impacts. Fifth, the section will explore Latin America’s artificial 
intelligence capabilities and the types of influence that the United States and China have 
with exporting their technology.  
1. Artificial Intelligence: Definitions and Variations in the Technology 
The literature and research present several definitions of the meaning of artificial 
intelligence, ranging from sentient beings to aspects of machine learning. It is crucial to 
understand how to define the term so we can understand how it will apply to the thesis.  
Araya and Nieto-Gomez give a detailed summary of artificial intelligence 
technology:  
Since its inception some 60 years ago, artificial intelligence (AI) has 
evolved from an arcane academic field into a powerful driver of social 
transformation. AI and machine learning (ML) are now the basis for a wide 
range of mainstream commercial applications, including Web search, 
medical diagnosis, algorithmic trading, factory automation, ridesharing, 
and, most recently, autonomous vehicles. Deep learning — a form of ML 
— has dramatically improved pattern recognition, speech recognition, and 
 
13 Charles W. L. Hill, “Establishing a Standard: Competitive Strategy and Technological Standards in 
Winner-Take-All Industries,” The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005) 11, no. 2 (1997): 7, 24. 
6 
natural language processing (NLP). However, AI is also the basis for a 
highly competitive geopolitical contest.14 
Ovanessoff and Plastino explain that “AI is not a new field; much of its theoretical 
and technological underpinning was developed over the past 70 years by computer 
scientists such as Alan Turing, Marvin Minsky, and John McCarthy. Today, the term refers 
to multiple technologies that can be described in different ways.”15  As shown in Figure 1, 
Ovanessoff and Plastino explain and define how they view artificial intelligence.  
 
 
Figure 1. Three Types of AI.16 
 
14 Daniel Araya and Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “Renewing Multilateral Governance in the Age of AI,” 
Centre for International Governance Innovation, no. Modern Conflict and Artificial Intelligence 
(November 23, 2020), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/renewing-multilateral-governance-age-ai. 
15 Armen Ovanessoff and Eduardo Plastino, “How Artificial Intelligence Can Drive South America’s 
Growth” (Accenture, 2017), 10, https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-49/accenture-how-artificial-
intelligence-can-drive-south-americas-growth.pdf. 
16 Source: Ovanessoff and Plastino, 11. 
7 
As shown in Figure 1, Ovanessoff and Plastino argue that there are three types of 
artificial intelligence to include: sense, comprehend, and act.17  First, the sense is related 
to “computer vision and audio processing,” such as “facial recognition at border control 
kiosks.”18 Second, comprehension is related to “natural language processing,” for 
example, “language translation feature of search engine results.”19  Third, by the act, they 
describe as an “AI system,” which can “take action through technologies such as expert 
systems and inference engines, or undertake actions in the physical world” like self-driving 
cars.20  The key to the recent growth of artificial intelligence is “unlimited access to 
computing power”  and “growth in big data.”21  With the recent growth in artificial 
intelligence, the world has seen developments in virtual agents identify analytics, cognitive 
robotics, speech analytics, recommendation systems, and data visualization.22   
Arend Hintze argues four types of artificial intelligence: reactive machines, limited 
memory, the theory of mind, and self-awareness.23 First, relative machines are the “most 
basic types of AI systems” like IBM’s chess-playing supercomputer, Deep Blue, or 
Google’s AlphaGo, which uses a neural network, a type of network that mimics the human 
brain.24  Second, limited memory is a “this Type II class contains machines that can look 
into the past. Self-driving cars do some of this already. For example, they observe other 
cars’ speed and direction. That cannot be done in a just one moment, but rather requires 
identifying specific objects and monitoring them over time.”25 Third, in the theory of mind 
in the future, machines will understand “thoughts and emotions that affect their own 
 
17 Ovanessoff and Plastino, 22. 
18 Ovanessoff and Plastino, 10. 
19 Ovanessoff and Plastino, 10. 
20 Ovanessoff and Plastino, 10. 
21 Ovanessoff and Plastino, 11. 
22 Ovanessoff and Plastino, 11. 





behavior.”26 Fourth, self-awareness or consciousness is “the final step of AI development,” 
in which machines can “build systems that can form representations about themselves.”27 
Another variation in defining artificial intelligence is that there are only “two types 
of artificial intelligence—hard and soft. Hard AI is having machines think like humans, 
while soft AI is focused on machines being able to do work that traditionally could only be 
completed by humans. The main difference is that soft AI doesn’t necessarily involve 
machines thinking like humans.”28 
Other definitions in the artificial intelligence and machine learning world include: 
Deep Learning and Extended Intelligence. Deep Learning is a catchall term for technology 
like skype, self-driving cars, translation apps, internet security, and online targeted ads.29  
Deep Learning combines “the most powerful machine learning technique” and requires 
“large datasets to achieve high performance.”30  Extended intelligence “is using machine 
learning to extend the abilities of human intelligence.”31   
For the purposes of the thesis, the working definition will include the broad topics 
when discussing artificial intelligence to include basic automation, rules-based systems, 





28 Julie Sobowale, “How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal Profession,” ABA Journal, 
April 1, 2016, https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
how_artificial_intelligence_is_transforming_the_legal_profession. 
29 Cade Metz, “Finally, Neural Networks That Actually Work,” Wired, April 21, 2015, 
https://www.wired.com/2015/04/jeff-dean/; Cade Metz, “I Took the AI Class Facebookers Are Literally 
Sprinting to Get Into,” Wired, March 27, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/03/took-ai-class-facebookers-
literally-sprinting-get/. 
30 Michael Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence” (Washington, 
DC: Center for a New American Security, July 2018), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/strategic-
competition-in-an-era-of-artificial-intelligence. 
31 Scott Dadich, “Barack Obama Talks AI, Robo Cars, and the Future of the World,” Wired, October 
12, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/10/president-obama-mit-joi-ito-interview/. 
32 Naval Postgraduate School, “Harnessing AI Course - AI Group - Naval Postgraduate School,” 
accessed April 30, 2021, https://nps.edu/web/ai-group/harnessing-ai-course. 
9 
2. Key International Leaders’ Statements on Artificial Intelligence 
Leaders worldwide see the strategic impact on the world regarding how it has and 
will influence politics, economics, and national security. In 2016, President Obama’s White 
House reported, “AI holds the potential to be a major driver of economic growth and social 
progress.”33  In 2016, President Obama talked about how algorithms could potentially take 
down financial networks or figure out how to launch nuclear weapons.34  He explained 
that we need to develop “international norms, protocols, and verification mechanisms 
around cybersecurity generally, and AI in particular, is in its infancy.”35  He expounded 
that investment in cybersecurity and AI would be necessary to remain competitive 
domestically and internationally. Cybersecurity and artificial intelligence will require 
coordination to ensure that the information systems are secure from criminal threats, 
military threats, or espionage.36  Automated cyber techniques will make ‘spear phishing’ 
easier to conduct by criminals and adversaries since systems will correlate data more 
accessible.37  Also, artificial intelligence has so many facets and applications that it is 
difficult to define; therefore, in general, there is a concern that our leaders will not fully 
understand the potential of AI.38   
Vladimir Putin agreed with Barack Obama about the importance of artificial 
intelligence, but he framed it in a much more competitive way. In 2017, Vladimir Putin 
expressed, “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia but for all humankind. 
It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever 
becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”39  Putin framed 
artificial intelligence in a realism perspective and very competitive perspective.  
 
33 Vincent, “China and the U.S. Are Battling to Become the World’s First AI Superpower.” 
34 Dadich, “Barack Obama Talks AI, Robo Cars, and the Future of the World.” 
35 Dadich. 
36 Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” 17. 
37 Cade Metz, “Good News: A.I. Is Getting Cheaper. That’s Also Bad News.,” The New York Times, 
February 20, 2018, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/technology/artificial-
intelligence-risks.html. 
.38‘ Dadich, “Barack Obama Talks AI, Robo Cars, and the Future of the World.” 
39 Putin, “‘Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World’.” 
10 
The China Standards 2035 plan also expressed the intent for the Chinese 
“government and leading technology companies to set global standards for emerging 
technologies like 5G internet, the Internet of Things (IoT), and artificial intelligence, 
among other areas.”40  
Artificial intelligence will change warfare. United States Secretary of Defense 
Esper said that “artificial intelligence will likely change the character of warfare, and I 
believe whoever masters it first will dominate on the battlefield for many, many, many 
years. It’s a fundamental game-changer. We have to get there first.”41  Esper spoke about 
this in 2018 when the Department of Defense established the Joint Artificial Intelligence 
Center (JAIC).42 
In 2019, President Trump continued the American stance that “continued American 
Leadership in AI is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national 
security of the United States and to shaping the global evolution of AI in a manner 
consistent with our Nation’s values, policies, and priorities.”43  In March 2021, the interim 
national security guidance expresses that artificial intelligence, among other technologies, 
poses “both peril and promise.”44 Overall, the leaders around the world see the future of 
artificial intelligence, which can be positive and negative depending on how the 
technologies get implemented.  
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3. The United States and China Great Power Competition in Latin 
America 
This section reviews what great power competition is and how it takes place in 
Latin America between the United States and China.  
a. Great Power Competition 
Great Power Competition or renewed great power competition is the common term 
for competition between the United States, China, and Russia.45  However, it has also has 
been described with “the term Cold War (or New Cold War, or Cold War II or 2.), 
particularly about the U.S.-China relationship,” and also includes “competitive world 
order, multipolar era, tripolar era, and [the] disorderly world (or era).”46 The great powers 
compete for power and expand their influence through political, economic, and military 
strategies and tools.47  Great Power Competition is a global struggle for geopolitical 
influence and strength. One area of competition is artificial intelligence.48   
Artificial Intelligence is important within great power competition for great power 
competition because if a country can dominate and control the marketplace, it will have 
economic, political, military, and intelligence advantages. Artificial Intelligence is an 
“emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence 
on military power, strategic competition, and world politics more broadly.”49   
b. Competition between China and United States in Latin America 
Leigh Wendall argues that the United States and China will impact Latin American 
countries because there will be pressure to choose a side by choosing a technology 
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Competitive Edge, 1; O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for 
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47 O’Rourke, 21. 
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49 James Johnson, “Artificial Intelligence & Future Warfare: Implications for International Security,” 
Defense & Security Analysis 35, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 147, https://doi.org/10.1080/
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company or standard.50  If Chinese technology become the norm or standard in some 
countries, other countries will be more likely to economically bandwagon since there are 
economic incentives and capability incentives to do so.51  Since the United States political 
atmosphere is challenging for Latin America, the Chinese focus on the Latin America 
region.52  In 2017, China’s foreign direct investment in South America was $25 billion, 
which has grown substantially since 2000.53 
Wendall also argues that China has increased influence since some countries have 
shifted their stance on Taiwan because of Chinese influence and investment, although the 
United States has warned other countries to avoid the trap.54 Marc Lanteigne, an author of 
Chinese Foreign policy, explains that one of the critical foreign policy objectives of the 
Chinese is the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.55 
Ellis, a leading Latin American and China scholar, argues that China presents a 
long-term and indirect national security challenge in the Western Hemisphere.56  Ellis 
explains that yes, the Chinese are competitors, but the United States can view the 
competition as simply that and not a current direct threat to national security. Ellis argues 
that the Chinese are a “long-term challenge to U.S. national security” not by direct conflict, 
but by “encouragement of the gradual weakening of the U.S., vis-à-vis the P.R.C, as 
potential political, economic, and military challenger.”57  Ellis explains that the “severity 
of the challenge, and its potential to transform from a difficult to define erosion of U.S. 
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Routledge, 2020), 6. 
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2017), 14. 
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global position and long-term prosperity to an acute military threat, will depend, in part, 
on the adeptness of U.S. policymakers in navigating the landscape of threats and 
opportunities stemming from the rise of China as a dominate global actor.”58   
Ellis highlights that China “explicitly mentions its desire to expand and deepen 
interactions with Latin America and the Caribbean in 35 areas, including science and 
technology and military interactions.”59  According to the Chinese government, the focus 
for the region is on “energy and resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, 
manufacturing, science and technological innovation, and information technologies.”60 
Peter Smith, a Latin American author, agrees with Ellis about the fact that the 
United States has the upper hand in the competition in Latin America, but we must continue 
to uphold our democratic values. Smith argues that the United States “has been stronger 
and richer than its Latin American neighbors,” which has been a “persuasive and persistent 
reality.”61  
4. Artificial Intelligence – Geopolitical Impacts – Tool of Influence 
a. What are Geopolitics? 
Any power struggle over a given territory. We are talking, therefore, not 
only about the influence of natural givens on balances of power (what 
Anglo-American experts on international relations sometimes call 
“geopolitics”) but also about the territorial aspects of rivalries and the 
localization of forces present in a broad international context.62 
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(University of California, San Diego: Oxford, 2012), 4. 
62 Yves Lacoste, “Geography, Geopolitics, and Geographical Reasoning,” Herodote No 146–147, no. 
3 (2012): 14–44. 
14 
b. Geopolitical Impacts 
Overall, the United States leadership, China, and Russia have all realized that 
artificial intelligence will significantly impact politics, economics, and the military. They 
have all been moving forward to adapt their initiatives and strategies in which they are 
competing. 
c. Artificial Intelligence and National Security  
Horowitz, an author on national security and artificial intelligence, and others argue 
that artificial intelligence will “influence defense, diplomacy, intelligence, economic 
competitiveness, social stability, and the information environment, falling behind in AI 
development and implementation would present a risk for U.S. global economic and 
military leadership.”63  He goes on to argue that the United States might be in a “new space 
race.”64 The difference is that China has experienced a Sputnik moment, whereas the 
United States has not had that moment.65  Although, in September 2020, the United States 
conducted its first “DOD AI symposium and Exposition,” which means the United States 
is at least taking the threat seriously.66  Scott Kenney, a national security author, would 
argue that even with a Sputnik moment that the Chinese still have “substantial distance to 
travel before it approaches the level of innovation found in the world’s most advanced 
economies.”67  
Tim Stevens, an author about artificial intelligence and cyber, would agree with 
James Johnson that if artificial intelligence “left unchecked, the uncertainties and 
vulnerabilities created by the rapid proliferation and diffusion of AI could become a major 
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potential source of instability and great power strategic rivalry.”68  Johnson explains that  
“several AI-related innovations and technological developments that will likely have 
genuine consequences for military applications from a tactical battlefield perspective to the 
strategic level.”69  Stevens focuses the argument by explaining that artificial intelligence 
will have strategic and tactical consequences, especially for cybersecurity for the military 
and intelligence community.70 
d. Artificial Intelligence, Economics, and Politics  
Scott Dadich and Daniel Susskind explain that economically, artificial intelligence 
will create new jobs and industry this type of change by changing the type of jobs required 
due to increased machine learning capabilities and increased robotics, which shifts job 
requirements.71  James Johnson explains that due to reduced costs in automated systems 
like low-cost remotely piloted aircraft and increased digital and physical infrastructure, 
national security institutions will have to adjust to continue to compete.72  
Politically, governments will need to adjust to mitigate the risks of people losing 
jobs due to changes in the economy and ensure that the business and political and national 
security institutions remain competitive. Susskind argues that technology will likely 
increase economic inequality and potentially create a world without work.73  Governments 
and the labor market will have to make shifts in investment in education and training to 
ensure that there is no political unrest or economic decline since people potentially will 
lose jobs to machine learning and automation. 
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During his presidency, Barack Obama explained that artificial intelligence would 
affect medicine, transportation, electricity, improved economy, and prosperity.74  
President Obama commented that societies would have to avoid losing jobs, increasing 
inequality, and suppress wages since artificial intelligence could displace jobs in various 
professions.75  Governments and businesses will have to invest in “re-skilling” the 
workforce.76  
5. Latin America Artificial Intelligence Review – Latin America AI/
Reactions to China and U.S. 
a. Latin America 
In general, authors like Georgy Allen, David Dollar, Ted Piccone, and Ellis would 
agree that China is competing for influence and taking advantage of opportunities in Latin 
America. However, they would also agree that the United States overall has the advantage 
over China in the region. Latin America will be a terrain in which great power competition 
occurs since China and Russia attempt to influence America’s geopolitical backyard. 
Artificial intelligence and other technologies are one area of competition.77  Latin 
America’s relationship has evolved because of recent United States politics that have led 
some countries in the region to seek economic and political support from China.78  
China has been more willing to help with loans, investment, and trade.79  For 
example, China has sought oil and minerals from Venezuela, and China gave loans to 
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Venezuela for its infrastructure.80 China has a trans-Amazonian railway project with Brazil 
and Peru and working a canal in Nicaragua.81  The Chinese allegedly have a scientific base 
in Argentina.82  All the investment, loans, and trade deals are typically in the Chinese 
interest, and the countries have to make political concessions, but in recent years, there has 
been some push back against China.83  China has been marketing and selling its face 
recognitions surveillance capabilities to countries in South America.84  For example, 
Educator purchases a system from China that includes integrated surveillance cameras, 
drones, thermal devices, and an artificial intelligence analysis center.85 
In general, artificial intelligence is another technology that both the United States 
and China can sell to the region, which in turn would influence the region economically 
and specifically with the developing norms associated with the technology. Some countries 
in Latin America are taking the loans and seeking support from China, but countries in 
Latin America are concerned about Chinese influence just as much as there is concern 
about U.S. influence.86   
From 2013 – 2018, China led the world in investment in artificial intelligence and 
how “60 percent of the total AI investment and funding over that time. In 2017, China 
 
80 Miquel Vila Moreno, “The Geopolitics of China in Latin America in Donald Trump’s Era,” 
Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (IsAG), April 30, 2017, 
https://isagitalia.org/the-geopolitics-of-china-in-latina-america-in-donald-trump-era/wp_8846263/. 
81 Vila Moreno. 
82 Cassandra Garrison, “China’s Military-Run Space Station in Argentina Is a ‘Black Box,’” Reuters, 
January 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2; Vila 
Moreno, “The Geopolitics of China in Latin America in Donald Trump’s Era.” 
83 Vila Moreno, “The Geopolitics of China in Latin America in Donald Trump’s Era”; Miquel Vila 
Moreno, “China Adapts to a Changing Latin America,” March 13, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/
china-adapts-to-a-changing-latin-america/. 
84 Evan R. Ellis, U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America 
(Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War, 2005), 9–10; Charles Rollet, 
“Ecuador’s All-Seeing Eye Is Made in China – Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2018, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/09/ecuadors-all-seeing-eye-is-made-in-china/. 
85 Rollet, “Ecuador’s All-Seeing Eye Is Made in China – Foreign Policy.” 
86 Ted Piccone, “China and Latin America: A Pragmatic Embrace,” Brookings (blog), July 20, 2020, 
1, https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-and-latin-america-a-pragmatic-embrace/. 
18 
accounted for 70 percent of the 39.5 billion U.S. dollars invested in artificial intelligence 
worldwide in that year.”87 
The Chinese understand that they need to gain economic influence and power to 
win in great power competition. Therefore, the Chinese target people, the military, and 
infrastructure to steal economic and military data to close the gap.88  Since artificial 
intelligence will enable cyber operations and the Chinese have stolen technology, 
conducted surveillance, and hacked business, the Chinese will likely use artificial 
intelligence technology to improve and adapt these capabilities.  
Georgy Allen, David Dollar, and Ted Piccone generally would agree that China’s 
artificial intelligence is essential strategically for China and that the Chinese have an 
investment in Latin America, although it is unlikely to lead to military conflict. Allen 
argues that “China’s government views AI as a high strategic priority and is devoting the 
required resources to cultivate AI expertise and strategic thinking among its national 
security community.”89 David Dollar, an author on Latin America, summarizes how 
“China has made headlines in Latin America through some large investments in countries 
that have poor governance, notably Venezuela and Ecuador. Yet the largest share of 
China’s ODI has gone to Brazil, a country with relatively good governance in Latin 
America.”90  China is attempting to gain access to natural resources in the area of poor 
governance.91  Dollar argues that the investment in Venezuela is an example of “Beijing 
filling the void left by a decline American Presence.”92  Dollar generally agrees with 
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Piccone in the fact that China’s investment has been relatively benign and unlikely to 
generate conflict.93 
b. Latin America Artificial Intelligence Capabilities  
There is a knowledge gap of artificial intelligence development and education in 
Latin America that is increasing. Therefore, people with more resources can access the best 
tools and education, leapfrogging them ahead of the overall population. Fortunately, 
technology has enabled alternatives that offer opportunities to more people as well.”94 
Latin America shows initiatives in artificial intelligence development, especially in 
business, where about 80% of large businesses use artificial intelligence.95  Artificial 
intelligence “could help raise living standards, lower healthcare costs, and promote 
government accountability.”96 Latin America could develop artificial intelligence talent, 
making the region a “global delivery [centers] for AI applications.”97  
For example, in 2018, Mexico became “one of the first ten countries in the world 
to deliver a National Strategy for AI.”98 Mexico “was the first Latin American country to 
formulate a national AI strategy in 2018, with key objectives outlined for reducing 
corruption and crime, improving public health and boosting financial inclusion.”99  Since 
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then, the Mexican legislature and local governments have been advancing the policies.100  
Mexico is considered one of the “largest Spanish-speaking region [s]generating data, and 
consequently, a gigantic incubator of AI technologies.101   
Another example, Chilean and Peruvian mining companies are using autonomous 
machines.102  Automation is saving the company money and increasing efficiency.103  
Another example is Argentina using “machine-learning-based tools that let citizens in 
Argentina report problems like potholes and uncollected garbage.”104   
Latin America has “good examples of AI initiatives” in Latin America, but Latin 
America has several challenges to increase the development, which include: “lack of 
specialized AI talent,” “lack of data to use in AI systems,” “insufficient or incorrect 
understanding of AI technology in the marketplace,” and “insufficient funding.”105  Like 
the mining industries, companies lack the data, especially in large amounts, to make as 
artificial intelligence useful as it could be.106  However, Mexico and other developing 
countries have economic difficulties that “slow down the potential of their progress, 
contribution, and technological leadership.”107 
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c. Regional Reactions 
Piccone, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, recently argued that 
regional Latin America and the Caribbean countries have accepted Chinese investment in 
the earlier through the mid-2020, but the “honeymoon” for China is over in Latin America 
since the regional view has shifted to “a more programmatic embrace circumscribed by a 
mix of both popular and elite skepticism of the benefits of getting too close to Beijing.”108 
Piccone argues that the United States “woken up to the long-term threat Chinese 
poses,” but the United States has recently “failed to leverage these trends by setting the 
proper tone or substance for policies that would help swing relations back towards 
Washington.”109 
6. Thesis Roadmap 
The thesis is broken down into three additional chapters. Chapter two reviews the 
overall Chinese global strategies regarding artificial intelligence and other technologies. 
Chapter two highlights that the Chinese want to be the leader in artificial intelligence. 
Chapter three focuses on the Chinese artificial intelligence initiatives in Latin America. 
Chapter three shows that the Chinese have a numerical advantage of the number of 
countries using Chinese artificial intelligence technology over the United States. Chapter 
four concludes with findings and recommendations. Overall, the Chinese appear to have 
an advantage, and if the United States wants to remain the partner of choice, then America 
must react to counter the Chinese moves in Latin America and the Caribbean.   
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II. CHINESE STRATEGIC ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
PLANS AND GOALS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The chapter will review the various Chinese strategic goals and plans regarding 
economic, technology, and artificial intelligence. Overall, the Chinese military-civil fusion 
gives them some effectiveness and advantages in the artificial intelligence competition.110  
The recent national security commission on artificial intelligence clearly summarizes 
China’s artificial intelligence and what the chapter explores:  
China is organized, resourced, and determined to win the technology 
competition. A.I. is central to China’s global expansion, economic, and 
military and domestic stability. It has had a head start on executing a 
national A.I. plan as part of larger plans to lead the world in several critical 
emerging technology fields. Beginning in 2017, China established A.I. 
goals, objectives, and strategies tied to specific timelines with resources by 
committee leadership to lead the world in A.I. by 2030. China is executing 
a centrally directed systematic plan to extract A.I. knowledge from abroad 
through espionage, talent recruitment, technology transfer and investment. 
It has ambitious plans to build and train a new generation of AI engineers 
in new AI hubs. It supports “national champion” firms (including Huawei, 
Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, iFlytek, and SenseTime) to lead development of 
AI technologies at home, advance state-directed priorities that feed military 
and security programs under the rubric of military-civil fusion, and capture 
markets abroad. It funds massive digital infrastructure projects across 
several continents. China developed an intellectual property (IP) strategy 
and is trying to set global technical standards for AI development. And its 
laws make it all but impossible for a company in China to shield its data 
from the authorities.111   
B. CHINESE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES  
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has various initiatives to gain economic and 
technology growth and influence include the well-known Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
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Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), Digital Silk 
Road (DSR), Made in China 2025, China Standards 2035, and the New Generation AI 
Development plan to name a few.112  The various technology initiatives are highlighted in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Chinese Digital Ambitions.113  
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C. CHINESE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
COMPETITION GOALS 
The Chinese want to become leaders in technology and communication, including 
artificial intelligence, robotics, machine learning, quantum computing, and 5G.114 To 
implement this policy, the Chinese have increased their funding for artificial intelligence 
and other technologies which show that they are attempting to improve.115   
Since artificial intelligence will enable cyber operations and the Chinese have 
stolen technology, conducted surveillance, and hacked business, the Chinese will likely use 
artificial intelligence technology to improve and adapt these capabilities. This is a national 
security threat to the United States. Allen argues that “China’s government views AI as a 
high strategic priority and is devoting the required resources to cultivate AI expertise and 
strategic thinking among its national security community.”116  
D. CHINESE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Although the Chinese are disadvantaged regarding the number of artificial 
intelligence experts and amount of experience they have, the Chinese aspire to gain a 
technological advantage on the United States specifically with artificial intelligence and 
understand that it enhances its military capabilities and improves economically.117 The 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) domestically has used the various forms of artificial 
intelligence to help improve social control through new artificial intelligence surveillance, 
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which affects domestics security and censorship.118  In Latin America, as exemplified by 
in Ecuador and Venezuela, the thesis has shown that Chinese technology was used in a 
similar manner.119 Both the United States and the Chinese government likely want to avoid 
an artificial intelligence arms races, but both agree that it is highly likely.120  The Chinese 
have put out various reports and plans regarding artificial intelligence, and the United 
States recently written a national security commission on artificial intelligence.121 
The “New Generation AI Development Plan” and other Chinese reports 
underscores China’s goal to become the world’s artificial intelligence leader by 2030.122 
First, the plan is address and improve Chinese research and development.123 Second, the 
goal is to improve the number of products and applications are that associated with AI.124  
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Third, the intent is to market and grow the Chinese artificial intelligence industry.125 In 
short, the Chinese want to improve the entire process from R&D to marketing, to gaining 
market share in order to become the artificial intelligence leader.126As we have seen in the 
thesis, Latin America does not have robust artificial intelligence capabilities; therefore, 
some Latin America countries are open to buying or receiving products and capabilities, 
especially when they come at a low short-term cost. Also, specifically in the plan, the 
Chinese have encouraged their companies to “pursue a ‘going out’ strategy,” which we 
have seen in Latin America with acquisitions, investment, and establishing “research and 
development centers abroad.”127 
E. CHINESE MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) 
Overall, the Chinese are attempting to grow their economic, technological, and 
military strength.128 The technology aspect is central to economic development and 
military development.129 The Chinese are investing about $1.4 trillion in the recent five-
year plan in “building ‘new infrastructure‘ through AI, data centers, 5G, the Industrial 
Internet, and other new technologies.”130  For the military development, the Chinese are 
using an approach called  “military-civil fusion” (MCF)” to allow for technological and 
economic benefits while the military grows.131  President Xi’s goal is “dual circulation 
theory,” from which he wants domestic consumption and “technological self-sufficiency 
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after decades of export-led growth.”132  One aspect of all the civil military fusion is that 
the Chinese want to become the “premier global AI innovation center by 2030, potentially 
surpassing the United States in the process.”133 
The PLA have concerns about a United States “technological surprise attack.”134  
Therefore, the PLA are using the United States as a pacing threat much in the same way 
that the United States talks about China.135  The PLA foresee significant changes in 
warfare due to artificial intelligence and its various applications.136  Specifically, the PLA 
believe that “AI will accelerate the process of military transformation, causing fundamental 
changes to military units’ programming, operational styles, equipment systems, and 
models of combat power generation.”137 The PLA’s goal is to take advantage of artificial 
intelligence to gain military advantages and seize the initiative in the new and future 
wars.138   
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F. CYBER ESPIONAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT 
Artificial Intelligence technology is open source so the technology is easily copied, 
and artificial intelligence will enable cyber-attacks and cyber espionage.139  The People 
Republic of China (PRC) “maintains a robust capacity to conduct cyber operations through 
the combined use of network and psychological operations, media propagation, and 
electronic warfare capabilities” which artificial intelligence will assistant and improve the 
capabilities.140  The PRC conducts operational preparation of the environment (OPE) and 
conducts cyberwarfare across the spectrum of diplomatic, information, military, and 
economic (DIME).141  The PRC conducts cyber-espionage and cyber-enabled information 
operations to target other countries to advance their diplomatic, military, and economic 
goals.142 The Chinese have also compelled “foreign firms to transfer technology as a 
condition for access to its market,” but the Chinese have also conducted cyber espionage 
to gain technology information.143  The United States has reacted to these thefts negatively 
and sees it as national security and economic threat, and in 2017 “launched an investigation 
into Chinese efforts to secure technology and IP through such practices.”144 Reporting in 
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Latin America, the use of Chinese artificial technology give the Chinese extra tools for 
intelligence collection and influence.145  The placement and access of technology 
infrastructure and artificial intelligence-enabled surveillance technology will give the 
Chinese the ability to conduct economic espionage, cyber-attacks, and disinformation 
campaigns.146 
G. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Chinese want to become the leader of the world in artificial intelligence 
to give them economic, military, and political benefits and advantages. The centrally 
planned artificial intelligence technology initiatives have supported Chinese companies 
going abroad to regions like Latin America. The Chinese companies gain placement and 
access to acquire artificial intelligence technology and companies through legal investment 
and through nefarious means or exploitation. The data and technology capabilities gain 
feeds into the military and state security intelligence capabilities and knowledge.  
Although Silicon Valley has a lot of A.I. expertise, the Chinese government focus 
and financial support has and will allow the Chinese to gain on the United States in artificial 
intelligence.147 The Chinese understand that to win in a great power competition; they 
need to gain economic influence and power. Therefore, the Chinese have targeted people, 
governments, businesses, militaries, and infrastructure to steal economic and military data 
to close the gap.148  The Chinese have argued that these claims are not true and that there 
is “no evidence of security flaws, or of Chinese intelligence accessing any information 
from a company like Huawei.”149  The thesis research has shown that Huawei is operating 
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in Latin America. Various Chinese laws can obligate or compel companies to support 
Chinese government intelligence operations.150 
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III. CHINESE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and China are engaging in technology competition.151  For the 
policy makers, business leaders, strategics, and practitioners, the state of the competition 
is important especially if the goal of the Chinese is to become the “premier global AI 
innovation center” by 2030 with the intent of the PLA to leapfrog the United States.152  To 
frame the current state of the competition between the United States and China in Latin 
America, this chapter will explore Chinese influence in Latin America. While, the section 
will briefly review Chinese military, political, and economics activities in the region, it will 
primarily focus on the primary section focus will be the Chinese artificial intelligence, 
surveillance technologies and economic activities since they represent the greatest and 
most lasting, potential impact in Latin America.  
Overall, the chapter shows the general expansion of artificial intelligence 
technology being sold to countries around the world to include Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the data shows that more countries are 
exclusively using Chinese artificial intelligence surveillance technology than the United 
States or any other country from companies like Huawei. The chapter looks at Venezuela 
and Ecuador to see the impacts of Chinese artificial intelligence technology. In Venezuela, 
the Chinese support with loans and investment along with artificial intelligence 
surveillance technology which was used to repress dissent against the regime has allowed 
Maduro to stay in power. In Ecuador, the Chinese sold artificial intelligence surveillance 
software to the country. The Chinese have used Ecuador as a marketing tool since the 
Chinese technology helped Eduardo during a recent earthquake and in hospitals during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.   
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B. THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF AI SURVEILLANCE153 
Based on the world map in Figure 3, Latin America shows that they have leaned 
towards Chinese artificial intelligence technology. The map shows that the world consists 
mostly of the United States and Chinese artificial intelligence technology. Also, it appears 
that the Chinese have a lead in Africa and South America since some countries exclusively 
have just Chinese artificial intelligence technology.  
   
Figure 3. Global Expansion of AI Surveillance.154 
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Overall, research shows 75 out 176 countries “actively using AI technologies for 
surveillance.”155  For Latin America, 10 countries in Latin America currently use artificial 
intelligence technologies as seen Figure 4.156   
 
Figure 4. AI Surveillance in Latin America.157 
Overall, globally, 63 countries that have Chinese AI technology, and 36 of those 
countries signed onto the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).158  The main Chinese 
companies involved include Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE, but the primary 
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company is Huawei.159  These companies provide various forms of artificial intelligence 
surveillance technology, smart city/safe city platforms, facial recognition systems, and 
smart policing platforms.160 
C. LATIN AMERICAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DATA 
Latin America and the Caribbean have demonstrated a “sizable take-up of AI 
surveillance instruments” from the Chinese.161 Specifically, based on this report, ten 
countries have artificial intelligence technology: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela reportedly have artificial 
intelligence surveillance technology, but only Bolivia and Venezuela are tied to the belt 
and road initiative.162  As seen on in Figure 3, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Venezuela 
exclusively use Chinese Technology.163  The following countries share United States and 
Chinese technology: Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.164  Of note, Panama 
signed on to the BRI. Finally, according to the report, Colombia uses only Japanese 
technology.165  Although, in 2020, a Chinese surveillance company called DaHu gave 
Columbia thermal cameras, which is not included in this the data for this section.166  
Therefore, Chinese technological influence is found within 9 of the 10 countries, whereas 
the United States technological influence extends to only 5 of the 10 countries, and the 
United States shares all of them with China. The next data from additional reports will add 
to the number of countries and territories that China has their technology in, but the 
research does not provide data on whether the United States has technology in those 
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countries. The other countries and territories include Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, British 
Virgin Islands, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.  
Overall, the Chinese artificial intelligence companies have a numerical advantage 
over the United States and other countries marketing similar artificial intelligence 
technology, which gives the Chinese a potential long-term economic and strategic 
advantage. Although the data is imperfect since companies have different incentives to 
keep information private or publicize it, the fact that approximately 90% of the countries 
in Latin America are using Chinese technology compared with 50% for the United States 
is a stark contrast. The data suggests that the Chinese have at least some sort of advantage, 
which could lead to economic bandwagoning and a strategic advantage in the artificial 
intelligence technology competition due to the effects of standardization and 
complementary products.167  Artificial intelligence represents a growing and expanding 
field, and Thomas Edison, although describing electricity, could have been talking about 
the future of artificial intelligence: “It is a field of fields…it holds the secrets which will 
reorganize the life of the world.”168 In general, throughout the world, the amount of 
Chinese artificial intelligence technology accessed by the number of countries has 
increased.169  Throughout the world, the Chinese use soft loans and subsidize all 
equipment for foreign businesses.170  In short, Latin American countries choose Chinese 
artificial intelligence and surveillance because of Chinese investment, lower cost, and 
easier access, compared to the United States due to their export restrictions established in 
2018.171 
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D. HUAWEI 
Exemplifying Huawei’s significant role as AI and surveillance technology exporter, 
it has sold or given technology to approximately 50 countries according to the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.172  Huawei reported triple their numbers from the 
2015 annual report, and in the 2018 annual report claimed that “safe city solutions now 
serve over 700 cities across more than 100 countries and regions including Brazil and 
Mexico” among others.173  In the Huawei 2019 annual report, the company states, 
“Huawei has helped more than 200 cities across over 40 countries and regions implement 
smart city projects”174  In the Huawei 2020 annual report, however, the company states, 
“smart city solutions currently serve over 700 cities across more than 40 countries and 
regions.”175  Due to the discrepancies in reported numbers, Huawei and China have 
focused on selling their products throughout the world, which is the key point.  
E. MAPPING CHINA’S A.I SURVEILLANCE 
According to an April 2019 report, which looked at 43 countries, and there were 75 
smart city projects throughout the world, which include “sensors, facial recognition 
cameras, and police body cameras connected to intelligence common centers.”176 In the 
follow-on report of November 2019 report, the report included a more expansive list of 
Chinese companies and focused on artificial intelligence and surveillance, the number of 
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smart city projects jumped from 75 to 115, with the majority concentrated in Europe, 
Africa, and South America.177 
According to the ASPI website tracker, currently eight countries and one territory 
utilize Chinese artificial intelligence or surveillance technology although the majority have 
surveillance technology.178  The countries and territories include:  Argentina, Chile, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Panama, and British Virgin Islands as seen in Figure 5.179  
The important takeaway is that Peru and the British Virgin Islands are new countries and 
territory added to the list for the Chinese. It is interesting to note that the report does not 
include Ecuador or Venezuela.  
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Figure 5. ASPI Map of AI and Surveillance Software in Latin America.180 
F. CHINESE GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE EXPORTS181 
In Figures 5, 6 and 7, Ecuador, Paraguay, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana 
are the only countries in South America without Chinese surveillance technology.182  
Based on the report, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic are new countries receiving 
Chinese technology that were not reported in other sources. 
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Reportedly, the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC), 
a subsidiary of China Electronics Corporations (CEC), is linked to the PRC defense 
industry and “has contributed significantly to public security technology projects in several 
countries in Latin America.”183  Also of note, in 2017, China Electronics Corporations 
(CEC) signed “contracts with Venezuela, Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago to build public 
security networks.”184  Trinidad and Tobago likely can be included in countries with 
domestic surveillance since it is likely that public security networks referred to domestic 
surveillance. 
 
Figure 6. Chinese Surveillance and Public Security Technology 
Platforms185 
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Figure 7. Chinese Surveillance Technology in Latin America.186 
G. CASE STUDY ON VENEZUELA 
China has a history of investing in technology infrastructure in Latin America, 
including Venezuela.187  Chinese supported Venezuela’s creation of digital identity cards, 
which allows the government to track individuals to suppress alternative views, and 
through which Maduro has maintained his power.188  The Maduro regime with the help of 
the Chinese Company, ZTE, helped implement the ‘Fatherland Card’ (Carnet de la Patria) 
program, which recorded personal identifiable information along with social media 
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presence, and political memberships.189  Beyond the card, ZTE helped build a mobile 
payment system, embedded a team to work with the state telecommunications company, 
and built the surveillance system.190 
1. Chinese Loans in Venezuela 
The biggest aspect of Chinese engagement and support has been the loans to 
Venezuela, “which is 53 percent of all money lent by China to Latin America.”191  In 2018, 
China owned “$23 billion worth of Venezuela’s foreign debt, making it the country’s 
biggest creditor.”192  The Chinese Development Bank and China Export Bank have given 
approximately $62.2 billion since 2007 through 2016 to companies focused on energy, 
mining, and infrastructure, which can be seen in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Chinese Loans in Venezuela.193 
Chinese money is difficult to track because they do not report or follow 
international community standards of for accountability.194 This lack of transparency 
allows Maduro to use the money buy and maintain his power.195  Additionally, the loan 
terms are longer than normal, which helps the regime since they do not have the increased 
pressure to pay back the loans.196 While, since Maduro came to power, the Chinese have 
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not given new lines of credit, they have extended the preexisting ones.197  In 2020, Maduro 
secured an additional grace period for Venezuela through at least 2020 to pay back the 
approximately $19 billion in loans.198  
2. Other Chinese Activities in Venezuela  
The Chinese have continued to be satisfied with the status quo while giving Maduro 
regime economic and political support despite the political and economic risks to China.199  
In 2018, Maduro traveled to China to seek additional support.200  Maduro gave a Chinese 
state corporation an additional 10% stake in a joint venture, but Beijing appeared not to 
give additional loans.201  The Chinese have also invested in Venezuela projects, which 
were never completed and likely used to give money to Venezuelan officials.202   
The Chinese opposed U.S. resolutions against Venezuela in the United Nations and 
supported the Venezuelans to win a seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council.203 
The fact that Venezuela was allowed on the council seems absurd unlikely since they have 
been accused of a refugee crisis and human rights violations.204   
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3. Chinese Impact on Venezuela
The Chinese have supported the Venezuelan regime economically and politically, 
specifically with loans, infrastructure investment, military, and technology support.205 The 
Chinese have been willing to accept delays in repayments in loans, and for a time, the 
Chinese were an outlet to avoid U.S. sanctions. The crisis in Venezuela has become worse, 
but there has been no changes with the Chinese since they do not want to interfere with 
Venezuela sovereignty.206  Because of the Chinese support, Maduro has stayed in power, 
even with low oil production, high inflation, and a coup attempt.207 This additional money 
also allowed Maduro to pay off power brokers and military leaders so he could maintain 
his control of the regime.208 In sum, the Chinese financial support and nonintervention 
policy with the regime have allowed Maduro to siphon money from the investments and 
the economy to help him stay afloat and avoid the full impacts of the sanctions.209   
H. CASE STUDY ON ECUADOR
The Chinese activities in Ecuador are a good example of how the Chinese can
market their domestic surveillance capabilities, which can lead to bandwagoning effects 
that “lead to market concentration and market power” in the long term if the United States 
does not compete against the Chinese companies.210  The Chinese sold Ecuador a video 
surveillance system that was funded by Chinese state loans and the fact that they needed 
an update to their system.211  The Chinese gain placement and access to Ecuadorian 
networks, which can be used for economic, political, and industrial espionage all of which 
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is a concern for Ecuador, the region, and the United States.212  These are all possible 
national security concerns for the United States.  
In 2011, the technology originally provided to Ecuador called “ECU911,” was 
furnished by China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC), a 
subsidiary of China Electronics Corporations (CEC).213  In 2017, the Chinese technology 
that Ecuador received was able to help them in during a massive earthquake.214  The 
Chinese have used this a marketing tool to help sell the idea to other Latin American 
countries.215 
Reportedly, the China Electronics Corporations (CEC) is focused on marketing and 
selling products in Latin American along with Africa. The general manager of CEC, Lui 
Liehong, said, “As Latin American countries industrialize, a country’s governance capacity 
should be enhanced by improving its information infrastructure. We’ve lots of products 
and technologies that can help improve e-governance, public security and industry IT,” 
which include artificial intelligence and surveillance technology.216   
1. COVID-19 and Chinese Artificial Intelligence
Huawei helped Ecuador and the countries hospitals “deploy AI-assisted CT scans 
screening systems to expedite the diagnosis of potential COVID-19 patients.”217  There 
was also new initiatives in Brazil which help during the pandemic.218 
I. CHINESE MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
Chinese will use military relationships in Latin America to influence key military
and security figures to gain overall geopolitics influence to include marketing the artificial 
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intelligence and domestic surveillance software. The Chinese are using all the tools of 
statecraft to ultimately to gain long term economic benefits, which will lead to military and 
political advantages over the United States. The military relationship can lead to investment 
or transfer of technology from China to those countries, for example, “China-based defense 
companies such as the NORINCO group have sold or given a broad array of equipment to 
the region’s security forces.”219  This section highlights several Chinese military 
engagements in Latin America. 
In general, the Chinese have regularly sent naval ships to “friendly port calls and 
military exercises.”220 Also, the Chinese conducted hosted Latin America officers in China 
and made various trips to the region.221  The Chinese have used the military to build 
relationships in the region. First, the Peace Ark, the Chinese Hospital Ship, has been 
deployed in attempt to establish soft power in the region a few times although it was 
reportedly missing from the region during the beginning of the 2020 pandemic.222  Second, 
between 2004 - 2012, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has sent about 143 members of 
military police to Haiti in support of an UN peacekeeping mission.223  Third, in 2015, the 
Chinese went to Brazil to receive jungle operations training.224  Fourth, the PLA have sent 
military members to the Lancero School in Columbia, and of note, the United States help 
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build the school when it was first established.225  Overall, the Chinese have been 
attempting to build their relationships in similar ways that the United States military 
conducts security cooperation and building relationships with foreign countries’ military.  
J. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY LINKS TO ECONOMIC SUPPORT IN
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS
China has exploited wedges in the United States relationships with specific
countries worldwide to further the Chinese foreign policy objectives. One of the critical 
foreign policy objectives of the Chinese is the reunification of Taiwan with mainland 
China. As of 2019, “only seventeen governments recognized Taipei.”226  In 2021, there 
are only fifteen countries that support the sovereignty of Taiwan.227  Since 2017, there 
were three countries in Latin America that have switched their alliance to China including 
Panama, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, and at the same time there was economic 
agreements along with Chinese companies gaining access to country.228 The shift from 
supporting Taiwan’s sovereignty to support the Chinese is evidence that Chinese economic 
incentives can be tied into their strategic objective, and it can be argued there is a form of 
bandwagoning that is showing up in this case. Latin American countries are susceptible to 
economic incentives; therefore, the Chinese technology would easily be accepted by other 
countries.  
K. CHINESE ECONOMIC GOALS IN LATIN AMERICA
Arguably, the Chinese strategic approach has focused on the economy, and
businesses to build assets, capabilities, and economic influence with the support and 
coordination from the CCP and commercial businesses.229  The Chinese have a predatory 
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approach in Latin America, which is a national security concern for the region and for the 
United States.  
1. Economics – Strategic minerals230
China has sought to gain majority share of a Brazilian company to get access to 
niobium, which is used in alloys for stainless steel, jet engines, rockets, and oil 
infrastructure.231 Of note, the United States government considers Niobium a strategic 
metal and the vast majority of the supply comes from mostly one mine in Brazil.232 China 
also owns lithium mines in has ownership in lithium mines in Chinese, Argentina, Bolivia, 
and Mexico.233 The United States considers Lithium a strategic metal, which is used for 
batteries to include electric vehicles.234 
2. Economics – Strategic Acquisitions235
The PRC investment has primarily been through mergers and acquisitions in Latin 
America, and the PRC may look to exploit opportunities due to the 2020–2021 
pandemic.236  The Chinese have been “exploiting the mutually reinforcing relationships 
between its leverage as a source of demand for Latin America exports control over sources 
of supply – especially commodities.”237  China can be described as predatory and looking 
for the gaps of the United States relationships in Latin America. Ultimately, although the 
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thesis is focused on artificial intelligence, the research shows that it is important to 
understand the other aspects of the Chinese moves since they could be adopted for 
technology infrastructure which will affect and threaten United States national security. 
Ports, canals, and waterways represent an area of national security due the 
placement and access that the Chinese could have to the areas. From a very realist 
perspective, hypothetically, the Chinese due to the placement and assess conduct a cyber-
attack to shut down or disrupt something like the Panama Canal, which in a conventional 
wartime scenario would add additional time for the United States Atlantic Fleet to transit 
to the Pacific Ocean.238 
For example, in Jamaica, the China Harbor Engineering Company Ltd. (CHEC) is 
a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company Ltd (CCCC) and used 
“used leverage from self-financing the North-South highway to obtain undervalued terrain 
for building lucrative tourism-related properties along the route.”239   
In Brazil, in 2017, China’s Merchant Port Holdings Co. Ltd. bought the share of 
Brazil’s most profitable portion terminal.240  The Chinese have exploited a Brazilian 
company, CRVD, by using the leverage gain by the purchase of the port.241 The China 
Communications Construction Company Ltd (CCCC) company offered to acquire the 
Paraná–Paraguay waterway, which connects Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and 
Uruguay. The water is “the gateway to most of the agro-industrial exports in South 
American trade bloc Mercosur, a very relevant factor for many companies.”242  If the 
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Chinese were able to control access to the waterway, this control and influence could also 
be a factor in economic bandwagoning since countries would be incentivized to work more 
closely with Chinese companies.  
L. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the Chinese appear to have an advantage in the number of countries that 
have Chinese artificial intelligence technology. Technology competition will be used by 
the Chinese and the United States as tools in the competition within Latin America. It 
appears that the Chinese based on the current data that they may be benefiting from some 
economic bandwagoning with their artificial intelligence technology.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. WHAT ARE THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS? 
The Chinese and the United States are racing and competing to “develop and 
deploy” artificial intelligence which will reshape “everything from the economic and 
military balance among states to the future of work, wealth, and inequality within them.” 
243  If the United States fails to win in the artificial intelligence competition the American 
long term “prosperity, security and welfare” will be in jeopardy since the Chinese goals are 
to become the world’s leader in artificial intelligence.244  Latin America provides a good 
case study of how Chinese artificial intelligence technology can be counter to the United 
States values of individual liberty when countries like Venezuela and Ecuador have used 
the tools for repression and surveillance.245 If the United States does not compete in Latin 
America and the rest of the world, then the U.S. will cede the right and the ability to 
negotiate about artificial intelligence values and mitigate some of the other national 
security concerns regarding artificial intelligence.246  
B. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thesis has looked at the national security concerns and quantified the amount 
of Chinese artificial intelligence presence in Latin America. The United States can use 
security sector assistance (SSA) to positively influence or shape our relationships with 
regionally significant countries that maintain strong bilateral economic or security ties to 
compete against Chinese influence.  
If Latin American and Caribbean countries choose American companies for their 
artificial intelligence capabilities, then investment in artificial intelligence via SSA has 
several benefits to the United States. First, the choice will help grow U.S. industry and 
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competitiveness. Second, U.S. values will influence the decisions to make when 
developing the technology and possible security implications to societal impact. Third, the 
United States’s government can use SSA to block “strategic and economic political 
advances of external state actors into the region.”247 
The final point about blocking specifically Chinese advances in the region is the 
most important aspect if one looks at the problem from a realist perspective. China has 
already made advances in some countries within the artificial intelligence space. 
Specifically, Ecuador purchased domestic surveillance software from the Chinese.248  
From a realist perspective, the United States is concerned about the Chinese increased 
ability to conduct cyber operations and surveillance. Additionally, in Latin America, the 
use of domestic surveillance could be abused if the correct values and ethics are included 
in the technology.  
C. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE/CYBER 
Latin America has large gaps in capabilities in cyber operations, and the increased 
effectiveness of AI-driven cyber will only exacerbate the capabilities gap. The United 
States must help mitigate the risk and decrease Chinese influence. If the Chinese can sell 
more of their software and artificial intelligence technology, the Chinese will gain a digital 
foothold. Therefore, security sector assistance can improve Latin America’s militaries and 
intelligence agencies to understand better how artificial intelligence-enabled cyber 
operations will potentially affect the military and government institutions to avoid the risk. 
USSOUTHCOM must continue to reinforce the cyber capabilities via SSA with Chile, 
Argentina, and Brazil.249 
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D. LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN A.I. CAPABILITIES 
To compete in the global competition in artificial intelligence development, the 
countries in Latin America will have to increase the talent pool, change the business 
culture, and make or get investments in the technology.250  However, Latin America does 
not have a lot of artificial intelligence investment.251  Therefore, SOUTHCOM must use 
SSA to help our partners and to allow the U.S. military and commercial entities to compete 
in the long term.  
E. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE  
Presidential Policy Directive-23 (PPD-23) explains the goals of security sector 
assistance.252  PPD-23 states that the United States must “help partner nations build 
sustainable capacity to address common security challenges” and also “promote universal 
value, such as good governance.”253  SSA aims to shape foreign partners’ policies, “build 
and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide safety and 
justice for their people,” and support their security challenges.254  Artificial intelligence is 
an area that needs to be addressed with security sector assistance in conjunction with a 
whole of government approach within a long-term strategy to this problem set that will 
touch upon politics, economics, and security issues.  
Investing in foreign countries’ militaries does not matter if the United States does 
not improve the other countries’ institutions.255  From the tactical-level units to the 
strategic level, the United States needs to show countries have a long-term commitment to 
support states through “economic development and state-building,” and the long-term 
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committed links to a long term strategic to build strategic alliance and partnerships in 
technology.256 USSOUTHCOM should not be the only COCOM with AI investment via 
SSA, but it should be part of every COCOM and government institutions and agencies’ 
strategy. Therefore, the chapters frame the issues regional within SOUTHCOM as a case 
study that applies to the global situation. The investment in artificial intelligence 
development will help develop long term payoffs.  
Ultimately, artificial intelligence will significantly affect the world and Latin 
America. Artificial Intelligence has already had a profound effect on the world, but there 
are many unknowns about how technology will influence jobs and domestic security, likely 
to have an effect in Latin America. Again, the United States wants to ensure that our 
government, citizens, and corporations influence the development of the algorithms and 
technology to ensure that our values and rules are built into the technology. 
USSOUTHCOM can use SSA to influence countries in Latin America to understand the 
importance of the technology, the benefits to improved governance in the region, and the 
threats of increased domestic surveillance in a region where this has been an issue even in 
the recent past during Operation Condor.  
F. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
Various programs could support the development of indigenous artificial 
intelligence capabilities or economic relationships with United States’ industries. The 
recommendation is to augment and add the focus of artificial intelligence education, 
development, and sales within Latin American countries.  
First, the Economic Support Fund can be used to allow the purchase of non-military 
capabilities. For example, Latin American countries can buy artificial intelligence 
capabilities to improve their economic efficiency or infrastructure; Chilean and Peruvian 
mining companies use autonomous machines.257  Automation is saving these companies 
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money and increasing efficiency.258  Another example is Argentina, which uses “machine-
learning-based tools that let citizens in Argentina report problems like potholes and 
uncollected garbage.”259   
Second, the program of “311, Exchange of Defense Personnel Between United 
States and Friendly Countries: Authority” allows specifically for the “mutual exchange of 
military or civilian engineers and scientists with friendly countries.”260  One issue that 
could limit exchanges is Department of Defense Directive 5230.11, which gives 
information on “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and 
International Organizations.”261 
Third, the program “332, Friendly foreign countries; international and regional 
organizations: defense institution capacity building” would allow subject matter experts 
and civilian advisors to help advise foreign militaries and security agencies.262 United 
States’s advisors will be essential to address the ethics and values during the development 
of algorithms to avoid biases or other problems that artificial intelligence algorithms can 
have.  
Fourth, the Information Exchange Program allows for the “exchange of technical 
data” for weapons development.263  Although this program might not be ideal within Latin 
America, the program could be significant in developing various robotics or autonomous 
vehicles, submersibles, or remotely piloted aircraft. For example, the U.S. military recently 
established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JIAC). USSOUTHCOM should follow 
the example and start their own cell to start working on the problem set. 
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Fifth, International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a very important 
program to help develop capabilities and understanding of artificial intelligence within 
Latin America since they do not have the inherent capabilities.264  An increase in the 
exchange could be beneficial to enable a growing understanding. Perhaps, expanding the 
authority of the program and to allow foreign students to attend more elite civilian schools 
will build a more capable, long-term strategic partner. In working with USNORTHCOM, 
Mexico could be an excellent candidate if the program had to start small since Mexico has 
shown initiative in developing the technology. For example, in 2018, Mexico became “one 
of the first ten countries in the world to deliver a National Strategy for AI.”265  
Finally, another critical program to support is the International Air and Trade 
Shows since the programs enable the defense industry to sell equipment.266  
USSOUTHCOM should promote artificial intelligence, robotics, and automated equipment 
to sell in Latin America. Of note, the restrictions on selling equipment would be the foreign 
disclosure issues and safeguarding important technology.267   
Overall, some programs can help promote artificial intelligence in Latin America. 
There are potential minor adjustments in authorities, and the programs would have to work 
around classified information or technology. The changes in the programs do not 
necessarily need a change in funding, but just a change in focus that is in line with a whole-
of-government approach and long-term strategy.  
G. SUSTAINABILITY  
One consistent issue is foreign aid and assistance sustainability, but investment in 
artificial intelligence should not be a concern since it needs to have a long-term strategic 
strategy. It should be funded in conjunction with a whole-of-government approach. The 
U.S. National Security Strategy expresses the need to be a leader in various technologies 
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265 Martinho-Truswel et al., “Towards an AI Strategy in Mexico: Harnessing the AI Revolution,” 6; 
Caversan and Marco, Chapter 2. Latin America: The Next Big AI Talent Pool in the Global Talent 
Competitiveness Index 2020: Global Talent in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. 
266 Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), Security Cooperation Programs, 89. 
267 Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), 89. 
59 
to include artificial intelligence.268  Therefore, the United States must promote the business 
and products in Latin America and partner with countries to have mutual benefit.269  We 
must balance partnership and the United States’s intellectual property.270 Security Sector 
Assistance can avoid areas that would compromise our intellectual property, but SSA can 
still use artificial intelligence to focus on areas like good governances and institution 
building, which Latin America requires, or enabling collection to target drug cartels.271   
H. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER/SAFEGUARDING OF INFORMATION  
Although there are restrictions on information, it can be difficult for the United 
States to transfer the technology, and some of the technology is in the civilian sector. The 
U.S. government and companies want to safeguard their intellectual property. Ultimately, 
the United States must abide by these rules. The national military strategy reflects the 
importance of artificial intelligence and the development of the technology.272 The 
strategy also reflects the importance of sustaining advantage in the western hemisphere.273  
The thesis argues an important part of maintain the advantages in the western hemisphere 
is to ensure the U.S. is the partner of choice for artificial intelligence.  
I. FUTURE MILITARY TRAINING 
The military must adapt to the changing landscape of warfare. Most military 
members are trained to use an M4/M16 assault rifle, but why are they not trained to use an 
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autonomous drone, social media accounts, and artificial intelligence impacts?274 Artificial 
Intelligence, machine learning, and automation will have a revolutionary and evolutionary 
effect on military operations. The military must train and force junior personnel to test and 
understand the various systems. Additionally, the military must drive the discussion of 
ethics, rules of engagement and potentially initiate changes to the ‘Laws of War’ to fit into 
a new battlefield with artificial intelligence and automated cyberspace. 
J. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The thesis recommendations focused on Department of Defense and Department of 
State programs with security sector assistance. Future research could focus on the private 
sector or civilian area solutions since artificial intelligence technology has been developed 
mostly in the private sector. Additionally, artificial intelligence will have broad impacts 
throughout society, therefore, future research would aid in understanding where the United 
States can help countries in Latin America and Caribbean regarding artificial 
intelligence.275  The recent United States Commission on Artificial Intelligence has 
various ideas that can be explored in future research including dialogue and collaboration 
with the Chinese.276  Overall, the Chinese and the United States are going to lead the world 
in artificial intelligence development and the competition could quickly spiral out of 
control if both countries do not look for areas of compromise and negotiations.277 The 
United States must compete in AI with a whole-of-nation or whole-of-society approach.278 
K. CONCLUSION 
Although the SSA investment in AI will not have short term gains, it will have long 
term strategic consequences, which is why the U.S. government must act in concert and 
with the private sector. As noted in the previous sections, Latin America does have some 
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indigenous capabilities, but in general, the region needs support, therefore, they will likely 
get it from Chinese or American companies and governments. If that happens, then it is 
likely that Latin America will improve economically, politically, and militarily.  
USSOUTHCOM wants to be a partner of choice.279 Not only does the United 
States need to be the partner of choice in Latin America for artificial intelligence, but SSA 
can also be used to influence the values of individuals and governments as they are learning 
about artificial intelligence technology. SSA investment in AI is a small tool with 
complications due to technology transfer issues, but if the U.S. government or industries 
can be the choice for AI in Latin America, then China will have less influence. 
Additionally, Latin American, and Caribbean countries need improved governance, which 
is one area that SSA can help influence.280 In conjunction with that, AI can help improve 
governments and economies’ efficiency and effectiveness, leading to a more effective 
partnership between Latin America and the United States.   
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